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Inbar: Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor ofMichael J.

The essays in this collection were written for an international conference held
in honor of the late Michael J. Handel
at the U.S. Naval War College. Handel
wrote several seminal pieces in the relatively new field of intelligence studies,
and his colleagues are to be complimented for producing this impressive
Festschrift. Betts and Mahnken put together an impressive group of practitioners and academics to write on various
aspects of the work of intelligence
agencies. It begins with four articles of
a theoretical nature, followed by three
articles that focus on historic case
studies.

situation additional noise. Handel also
stresses the paradox of estimating risk.
The riskier a military course of action,
the less a rival anticipates and prepares
for it, paradoxically making its eventual
adoption less risky. Handel also suggests that successive intelligence successes increase not only the agency’s
credibility but also the risk of strategic
surprise, because its conclusions will
be less subject to critical questioning.
There is also the self-negating prophecy. A warning of an impending attack
triggers military preparations that in
turn prompt the enemy to delay or cancel his plans. Such a scenario makes it
almost impossible even in retrospect to
know if the military preparations were
warranted. Another scenario that may
lead to a strategic surprise is a quiet
international environment that may
be used to conceal the preparations
for an attack. Following a fascinating
analysis of the problems of perception, the politics of intelligence, and
the organizational and bureaucratic
features, Handel reaches the realistic
conclusion that surprise is almost always unavoidable.

This volume appropriately opens with a
classic by Handel on strategic surprises,
published almost thirty years ago,
which serves as an excellent introduction to a book devoted to intelligence.
It is typical of Handel’s general thinking
on strategic affairs, pointing out several
paradoxes inherent to the potential for
strategic surprise that have become the
common wisdom of the intelligence
field. Handel claims that due to the
great difficulties in differentiating between “noise” and “signals” (relevant
information), all data amounts to noise,
making the collection of additional
information designed to clarify the

The second article, by editor Richard K.
Betts, starts with the unconventional
premise that politicization of intelligence services is not necessarily bad,
and sometimes it is even advisable.
Betts presents two opposing models of
intelligence work. The first portrays
the intelligence agency striving to
achieve professional credibility by presenting thorough analysis, while the
second depicts the intelligence organization stressing the supply of data that
is useful and relevant to decision makers. In the second case, the managers
of intelligence organizations make
compromises and tailor the information

only to those involved with North Korea. Anyone involved in negotiations
will benefit from this book.
XAVIER K. MARUYAMA

Monterey, California

Betts, Richard K., and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds.
Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor
of Michael J. Handel. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
210pp. $114.95
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to influence the decision-making process. Betts points out that there is inevitable tension between maximizing
credibility and utility, but he makes a
convincing case for reducing this tension by accepting a certain level of undefined politicization. Betts’s
recommended recipe for minimizing
the damage of politicization in the intelligence community is organizational
pluralism.
Woodrow J. Kuhns, a senior CIA official, next points out that despite the
fact that a significant number of intelligence failures have been documented, there is no clear track record
for estimates or warning judgments issued by the intelligence community.
Moreover, there is no accumulated
knowledge for distinguishing between
failures attributed to collection, or to
analysis. Nevertheless, Kuhns still
tends to regard intelligence forecasts as
closer to science than to pseudoscience, despite the methodological
problems in producing forecasts, and
suggests additional systematic research
to clarify the issues he has raised.
James J. Wirtz then discusses the theory
of strategic surprise and admits to operational difficulties. Wirtz claims that
every curriculum of the officers corps
stresses strategic surprise as a force
multiplier, and as such, military doctrine is predispositioned to carry out
surprises. Wirtz elaborates on the risk
paradox first mentioned by Handel,
pointing out the attraction of surprise
for the weaker parties of the conflict. At
this point, Wirtz argues that surprises
may produce only temporary spectacular results, leaving the general balance
of forces to finally determine the result
of armed conflict. Nevertheless, Wirtz
concludes that strong countries such as
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the United States must do their best to
prevent unpleasant surprises—such as
9/11, for example.
John Ferris reviews the evolution of
British military deception during the
two world wars. He provides a detailed
narrative on the deception efforts that
were highly regarded by the British generals. Ferris argues that deception
benefits the stronger player in the conflict and the one holding the initiative,
but he displays skepticism of its final
utility. This article could have benefited
from heavy editing, as it is deficient in
organization and in the use of theoretical concepts.
Uri Bar-Joseph’s article addresses the
question of why some Israeli intelligence officers—even at the highest
rank—erred in their estimates of the
probability of an imminent war in
1973. He argues convincingly that the
two officers most responsible for the intelligence failure were Y. Bandman and
E. Zeira, making the more general point
that organizations cannot transcend the
weaknesses of their personnel. However, Bar-Joseph could have made this
important point concerning the human
factor by explaining the lack of a strategic warning before the 1973 war without belittling other reasons for the main
misfortunes of the Israeli military in its
encounter with the Egyptian and Syrian
armies.
The final chapter, by Mark M. Lowenthal,
who is also with the CIA, looks at the
U.S. war-fighting doctrine that originally
emphasized information dominance
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), and subsequently more modestly aspired to superiority only (2000). Lowenthal warns
against the belief that technological advances can remove the fog of war. Even
the best technologies need appropriate
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doctrine to be useful. He argues cogently
that advanced intelligence systems have
their own vulnerabilities, and that lacunae of information are inevitable both
before and during war. Moreover, by
using examples from the American Civil
War, Lowenthal demonstrates that
good information about the enemy’s
moves and intentions is not enough for
winning the battle. It is generalship, the
human factor, that will continue to be
decisive in the outcome of a war.
This is an excellent introductory collection for students and the professional
reader to the gamut of issues with
which the field of intelligence grapples.
EFRAIM INBAR

Director, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Bar-Ilan University, Israel

Clancy, Tom, with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and
Tony Koltz. Battle Ready. New York: Putnam,
2004. 440pp. $28.95

This excellent book documents the military and postmilitary career of General
Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret.). It should appeal to any reader interested in the U.S.
military, the U.S. Marine Corps, and
national security affairs.
The book follows an engaging and
mixed style. Clancy and Koltz use short
biographical sections to introduce
phases of General Zinni’s career. At the
end of each phase, Zinni’s own words
(in italics) pick up the action. One has
the sense of being right there with the
general, sharing his experiences and
watching him develop into an exceptional military role model and leader.
The book actually begins with the end
of Zinni’s career. It is November 1998,
and he is halfway through his last
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assignment as the sixth commander in
chief of Central Command. We are introduced to the refined thinking of a
fighting soldier and leader, thinking
based on his extensive tactical, operational, and strategic experience in war,
conflict resolution, and peacemaking.
At that time, Zinni’s immediate focus
was Saddam Hussein and supporting
the UNSCOM (United Nations Special
Commission) inspectors under Richard
Butler. By mid-December, UN teams
began departing Iraq. What follows is
the four-day, preplanned attack of
Operation DESERT FOX. Although the
planning for the attack provides insight
into General Zinni’s war-fighting skills,
such as the importance and execution of
surprise, it is the introduction to his
breadth of strategic thinking that is most
interesting.
At the start of his command in August
1997, Zinni proposed a six-point strategic program for Central Command to
President Clinton’s secretary of defense,
William Cohen. His objective was to
take a more balanced approach to a
wide range of evolving security issues,
not just Iraq and Saddam Hussein. After presenting the program to Cohen
and senior members of Congress, Zinni
was politely told to “stay out of policy
and stick to execution.” That raises an
important point for military officers
preparing themselves for high command. Civilian control of the military
and selfless military service to the country are fundamental to our government,
going back to George Washington and
George Marshall. Based on the rest of
the book, it is apparent that Zinni consistently struck that delicate professional balance between the truthful,
informed, and forceful advice and respect for civilian authority.
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